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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Although conventional economic theory states that labour share and profit share  are 
constant in the long-term (Keynes 1939; Solow 1958; and Kaldor 1961), profit share has 
increased in the major advanced economies since the early 1980s, accompanied by the 
corresponding fall in the labour share (Stockhammer 2009 and 2012; Kristal 2010; Peralta – 
Escalonilla 2011; Dünhaupt 2011; Estrada – Valdeolivas 2012; and Lin – Tomaskovic-Devey 
2013). The fall in the labour share may lead to the rise in inequality of personal incomes 
(Karanassou – Sala 2013), exacerbate social strains (Dünhaupt 2011), and trigger a reduction in 
aggregate demand in the medium- and long-term (Naastepaad – Storm 2007; Hein – Vogel 
2008; Stockhammer 2012; and Dünhaupt 2013a).  
The financial sector has acquired great importance in most developed economies, a 
phenomenon sometimes termed financialisation (e.g. Krippner 2005; Epstein 2005). Hein 
(2012) stresses that financialisation decreases labour share through three channels: the change in 
the sectorial composition of the economy (weight of the financial sector and the size of 
government activity), the emergence of the “shareholder value orientation” paradigm, and the 
weakening of the trade unions’ power.  
A small body of literature has emerged in recent years to test the effect of 
financialisation on labour share. Most of these studies derive and estimate an equation for that 
share, finding statistical evidence that financialisation has caused a decline in the labour share 
and thus a rise in profit share (e.g. Stockhammer 2009; Kristal 2010; Peralta – Escalonilla 2011; 
Dünhaupt 2013a; Karanassou – Sala 2013; Lin – Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; and Alvarez 2015).  
As illustrated by Figure A1 in the Appendix, Portugal is not an exception to the global 
downward trend in the labour share since the 1980s, although the evolution has not been 
uniform (Lagoa et al. 2014). Our goal is to analyse whether the trend toward finance-dominated 
capitalism played a role in the evolution of the labour share.  
As seen above, financialisation has both a direct and indirect impact on labour share, 
with the latter working through the size of the public sector and trade unions' power. 
Consequently, we need to take other key variables into account when studying how 
financialisation affects functional income. This paper therefore aims to evaluate the impact of 
financialisation and other related variables (government activity and trade union power) on 
functional income distribution in Portugal between 1978 and 2012. It should be noted that, as 
we analyse the unequal distribution of income across production factors, inequality rises when 
the labour share decreases and profit share increases.  
The paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, whereas most studies address 
large, developed and highly financialised economies, this paper focuses on the less financialised 
Portuguese economy. Second, the paper uses a time series econometric analysis, distinguishing 
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between short-term and long-term effects of financialisation, and thus differs from most 
empirical studies which conduct a panel data analysis. This provides a better understanding of 
the historical, social and economic circumstances that are responsible for the evolution in 
functional income distribution.  
Portugal is an interesting case study because the financial sector enjoyed considerable 
growth after the 1980s but was followed by a sovereign debt crisis in 2011. Financialisation is 
not so developed in Portugal as in the USA or the UK and it is characterised by the dominance 
of banks. The vast majority of firms are small and medium, not quoted in the stock market and 
mostly use banking credit as their source of financing. As a whole, rentiers probably exert less 
pressure through financial markets than in other countries; however, the pressure exerted by 
shareholders at the annual general meeting and by the management board of non-quoted firms 
cannot be ignored. A systematic analysis of the financialisation process in Portugal can be found 
in Barradas et al. (2015) and in Rodrigues et al. (2016). 
Results indicate that the financialisation process conditioned the evolution of the labour 
share, notably through the channels of government activity and trade unions. This suggests that 
financialisation also affects the functional income distribution in smaller, less developed, less 
financialised and more peripheral economies. Moreover, we find support for the traditional 
explanations of the labour share, such as globalisation, technological progress, education and 
business cycle.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a short literature 
review on the relationship between financialisation and functional income distribution. In 
Section 3, we describe the variables included in the labour share model. In Section 4, we explain 
the data and the econometric methodology. The main results, discussion and policy implications 
are provided in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIALISATION AND 
FUNCTIONAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
 
 It is widely acknowledged that the well-being of a society depends on a fair income 
distribution. Conventional economic theory postulates that the growth of finance is in general a 
positive phenomenon, increasing the provision of funding (by channelling savings to borrowers 
through credit and other forms) and thus boosting economic growth (Levine 2005). The 
development of the financial sector and financial markets also provides access to funding for 
poorer economic agents, contributing to a more entrepreneurial stance and to the reduction of 
social and income disparities (Czaplicki – Wieprzowski 2013). 
4 
	
Nevertheless, some authors claim that financialisation leads to an increase in functional 
income distribution inequality. According to the Kaleckian perspective1, as theoretically 
discussed by Hein (2012) – Figure 1, this is explained by three different channels (and various 
sub-channels), which we explain below. 
 
Figure 1 – The effects of financialisation on inequality of functional income distribution (decrease in 
labour income share) 
 
 
 
 
 
Inequality of income distribution 
Change in sectorial composition Increasing importance of finance Downsizing of government activity 
  
“Shareholder value orientation” Rise in top management salaries Rise in the profit claims of rentiers 
  
Weakening of trade unions 
“Shareholder value orientation” 
Increasing importance of finance 
Downsizing activity of public sector 
Deregulation of labour markets 
Liberalisation and globalisation 
Source: Authors’ representation based on Hein (2012), Hein and Detzer (2014), Michell (2014), Hein and 
Dodig (2015), among others 
 
The first channel through which financialisation can affect labour share is related with a 
change in the sectorial composition of the economy, and it operates through two sub-channels: 
the increasing importance of the financial sector in relation to the non-financial sector in terms 
of value added, and the decreasing weight of government activity.  
On one hand, Hein (2012) recognises that the growth of the financial sector raises 
economy-wide gross profit share because its wage share is smaller than that of the non-financial 
sector. In this regard, Kus (2012) adds that the expansion of finance means a decline in the 
profitability of the non-financial sector, which in turn implies a contraction of middle-class and 
blue-collar wages in that sector. In addition, the growth of the financial sector has contributed to 
the weakening of policies and institutions that mitigate the effects of inequality, such as trade 
unions and/or minimum wage laws.  
On the other hand, Hein (2012) and Dünhaupt (2013a) admit that the downsizing of 
government activity also fosters a reduction in the economy-wide labour share, because the 
government is a “non-profit” sector in the national accounts and therefore has no capital 
income. Dünhaupt (2013b) reiterates that privatisations of public corporations are also 
associated with a decline in the labour share, as they have a smaller profit share than private 
																																								 																				
1 Stockhammer (2009) notes that different schools of thought provide various explanations of income 
distribution. Neoclassical economics emphasises the role of technology and preferences, 
Keynesian/Kaldorian economics highlights the importance of aggregate demand, and Marxian economics 
evoke the relative power relations in class struggle. According to Stockhammer (2009), these theories are 
only applied in a highly restrictive long-term equilibrium of a closed economy characterised by full capacity 
utilisation. They cannot be used to analyse the medium-term changes in income distribution of economies 
where capacity is underutilised and that are open to trade and international capital. These caveats are our 
main reasons for following the Kaleckian perspective. 	
5 
	
firms. The reduction in government activity (either directly or through public firms) is in part 
explained by the financialisation logic, which aims to extend market interests to areas 
previously under the control of the public sector.  
The second channel involves the increase in top management salaries together with a 
rise in the profit demands of rentiers. This is explained by the emergence of a new design of 
corporate governance (“shareholder value orientation”) (Crotty 1990; Aglietta 2000; Lazonick – 
O’Sullivan 2000; Stockhammer 2010; Dünhaupt 2011; Hein 2012; Kus 2012; and van der Zwan 
2014). The “neoliberal paradox” means that shareholders force firms to remain competitive and 
profitable even in downturn environments (Crotty 2005). D’Estaing (2003) stresses that the rise 
in managerial wages aims to attract the most talented top managers who contribute to the 
success and profitability of firms. However, he does not support this practice, especially when 
managerial wages are linked to stock market gains of the firm that do not depend exclusively on 
managerial talent. According to Hein (2012), the decline in the labour share was not larger 
because top management salaries are included in the labour share.  
Finally, the third channel is associated with the weakening of trade unions and, 
therefore, with the lower bargaining power of workers. The argument is that a higher bargaining 
power of workers leads to an increase in wages (Stockhammer 2009). Hein (2012) notes five 
specific sub-channels responsible for this.  
First, the “shareholder value orientation” makes firms seek profits (notably interest, 
dividends and capital gains) in financial rather than productive activities (Orhangazi 2008; Hein 
2012; among others); this has an adverse impact on employment and therefore weakens trade 
unions. Moreover, enterprises try to increase short-term profits by reducing the power of trade 
unions.  
Second, the growth of the financial vis-a-vis the non-financial sector has also weakened 
trade unions as they are traditionally stronger in the non-financial sector, notably manufacturing.  
Third, the downsizing of the government sector has impaired trade union power as there 
is a high level of unionisation among public servants. Inflation targeting policy by central banks 
often implies the adoption of fiscal austerity measures that restrain the government's ability to 
mitigate inequalities (Kus 2012). It may also depress aggregate demand with negative effects on 
employment, which in turn constrains bargaining for higher wages.  
Fourth, the trade unions' bargaining power has been undermined by the deregulation of 
labour markets since the 1980s. Most liberalisation measures have focused on reducing the level 
and duration of unemployment benefits, decreasing employment protection, and decentralising 
wage bargaining (Stockhammer 2004).  
Fifth, workers' bargaining power has been hampered by liberalisation and globalisation 
due to the “threat” by corporations of using outsourcing and relocating production to low-wage 
countries (Hein 2012); the shift of several manufacturing firms to low-cost economies and their 
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replacement with service sector firms (normally less unionised) – Dünhaupt (2013a); the growth 
of multinational corporations where labour has a weaker position than in national corporations – 
Dünhaupt (2013a); and the globalisation of the US non-financial corporations, which has 
implied higher levels of financialisation and fostered cost-reducing and flexibility strategies – 
Milberg (2008). Zamagni (2003) states that firms are becoming “nomadic”, because they are not 
rooted in a particular country, decreasing their sense of responsibility towards local 
communities, employees and other stakeholders.  
Trade unions and the downsizing of government activity are indirect channels through 
which financialisation affects labour share, as they are indirectly affected by the growth of 
finance. Financialisation leads to a decline in the importance of the public sector and trade 
unions’ power, which in turn reduces the labour share. In contrast, the channel of the increasing 
importance of the financial sector as well as the shareholder orientation channel offer a direct 
link between financialisation and functional income distribution.  
Other explanations of functional income distribution focus on the role of technological 
progress (Stockhammer 2009; Estrada – Valdeolivas 2012; Guerriero – Sen 2012; Dünhaupt 
2013a; Lin – Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; among others); labour market and product market 
policies and privatisations (Dünhaupt 2013a); and indicators of the political sphere (i.e., left 
government and civilian spending – Kristal 2010).  
Despite the increasing amount of theoretical work on the effects of financialisation on 
functional income distribution, there are few empirical studies, as noted by Peralta – Escalonilla 
(2011), Dünhaupt (2011 and 2013a) and Alvarez (2015). Nevertheless, a relatively small body 
of empirical literature has emerged in recent years estimating labour share equations to assess 
the impact of financialisation on functional income distribution. Most of these studies find 
statistical evidence supporting the theoretical claim that financialisation leads to a decline in the 
labour share.  
The large majority of studies resort to panel data analysis, either at the country or firm 
level (Stockhammer 2009; Kristal 2010; Peralta – Escalonilla 2011; Dünhaupt 2013a; Lin – 
Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; and Alvarez 2015). Judzik – Sala (2013) and Karanassou – Sala 
(2013) are exceptions as they use time series, but they do not directly study the impact of 
financialisation on functional income distribution. Estimations with panel data obtain an 
average effect for a set of countries, ignoring the historical, social and economic country-
specific circumstances (Kristal 2010; Dünhaupt 2013a; and Judzik – Sala 2013). Our work tries 
to overcome this shortcoming by using time series data for Portugal.   
In contrast with the literature that has focused mainly on large and highly developed 
economies, we make an empirical analysis of functional income distribution in a smaller, less 
developed and more peripheral economy.  
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Portugal's financialisation process has specific characteristics (Barradas et al. 2015; and 
Rodrigues et al. 2016), and not all variables evolved in line with what is expected in an 
increasingly financialised economy; more specifically there was not a clear upward trend in 
financial activity (Figure A6 in the Appendix) or in financial payments by non-financial firms 
(Figure A8 in the Appendix), and there was a clear upward trend in government activity (Figure 
A7 in the Appendix). However, the importance of trade unions has declined sharply since the 
1980s (Figure A9 in the Appendix) in keeping with the characteristics of an increasingly 
financialised economy.  
 
 
3. FINANCIALISATION AND FUNCTIONAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION: 
AN ECONOMIC MODELISATION 
 
In what follows, we estimate an equation where the total labour share of the economy is 
a function of standard variables: technological progress, globalisation, education and the 
business cycle. Moreover, we capture the effects of financialisation on labour share through the 
three abovementioned channels by introducing four additional variables: size of financial sector, 
government activity, shareholder orientation and trade union membership.  
The long-term labour share equation therefore takes the following form: 
 
(1) 
 
, where LS  is the labour share, TP  is technological progress, GL  is globalisation, ED  is the 
level of education, BC  is the business cycle, FA  is financial activity, GA is government 
activity, SO  is shareholder orientation, TU  is the weight of trade unions and th  is an 
independent and identically distributed (white noise) disturbance term with null average and 
constant variance (homoscedastic). 
It is worth noting that we will estimate an aggregate labour share function, as 
Stockhammer (2009), Kristal (2010), Peralta – Escalonilla (2011), Dünhaupt (2013a) and 
Karanassou – Sala (2013). This introduces some limitations; notably, it prevents the study of the 
differentiated effects of financialisation on industries and firms (of different size and 
ownership). This implies that we are not able to analyse whether financialisation has had a more 
intense effect on some firms, such as large firms or firms quoted in the stock market. However, 
the advantage of the macro perspective is that the impact of the phenomenon on the aggregate of 
workers can be studied. Nonetheless, if financialisation variables are found to have an effect, we 
are unable to say whether this is only due to some industries and large firms or if it is a 
tt8t7t6t5t4t3t2t10t TUSOGAFABCEDGLTPLS hbbbbbbbbb +++++++++=
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generalised phenomenon. Moreover, if the financialisation variables are found to have no 
macroeconomic effect, we cannot rule out a subset of workers from some industries or large size 
firms being affected, albeit not sufficiently to generate a macroeconomic effect. 
The coefficients of the independent variables are expected to have the following signs: 
 
(2) 
 
Technological progress is negatively related with the labour share, because it has 
become capital augmenting since the early 1980s but was labour augmenting in the 1960s and 
1970s (Stockhammer 2009; Guerriero – Sen 2012; and Dünhaupt 2013b). Technological 
progress has functioned as a complement to high-skilled labour and a substitute to low-skilled 
labour (European Commission 2007). This has resulted in an increase in the labour share of 
high-skilled labour that does not compensate for the decrease in the labour share of the low-
skilled labour, and thus has caused a fall in the labour share as a whole. 
The degree of globalisation is also expected to be negatively related with the labour 
share. The Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem postulates that trade raises the return on the factor 
that is relatively abundant (capital in the case of developed countries) and lowers the return on 
the other factor (labour in the case of developing countries) – Guerriero – Sen (2012) and 
Dünhaupt (2013b). Furthermore, the deterioration in the bargaining power of workers, discussed 
in the previous section, is another important effect of globalisation that lowers the labour share.  
The labour share depends positively on the labour force's education, given its positive 
effect on wages and employment (Guerriero – Sen 2012). Diwan (2000) and Daudey and 
García-Peñalosa (2007) confirm this hypothesis, especially for rich countries.   
Meanwhile, the business cycle may have a positive or a negative coefficient. On one 
hand, the labour share tends to increase in recessions and decrease in times of recovery 
(Dünhaupt 2013a and 2013b). Willis – Wroblewski (2007) offer three potential explanations for 
the countercyclical behaviour of the labour share: wages are sluggish; firms delay employment 
adjustments due to the costs of firing and hiring workers given the uncertainty in the business 
cycle; and workers refrain from demanding wage increases in exchange for wage security in 
downturns. On the other hand, according to Estrada – Valdeolivas (2012), the business cycle 
may positively influence the labour share, reflecting the traditional relationship between the 
business cycle and unemployment. They argue that when the demand pressures are high (low), 
the risk of unemployment is reduced (increased) and wages tend to rise (fall) jointly with 
employment, as suggested by the Phillips Curve.  
Finally, the financialisation variables are expected to be related with the labour share as 
discussed in the previous section: the labour share depends negatively on the weight of financial 
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activity and shareholder orientation, but positively on government activity and trade union 
representativeness.  
 
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY: THE ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK 
 
 4.1. DATA 
In order to analyse the relationship between financialisation and functional income 
distribution in Portugal, we use annual data between 1978 and 2012. Data for this period and 
frequency are suitable for the study for two reasons. First, the financialisation phenomenon 
became more preponderant in Portugal during the 1990s (Lagoa et al. 2013), and so the sample 
includes periods of stable growth of financialisation and periods of strong growth. Second, the 
fall in the labour share is a long-term structural phenomenon, and therefore annual data is likely 
to capture it better than higher frequency data.  
Regarding the definition of data, we use the adjusted labour share2 of the total economy 
as a percentage of the gross domestic product from AMECO. The adjusted labour share 
corresponds to the ratio between the compensation per employee and the gross domestic product 
at current market prices per employee.  
Since the dependent variable, the labour share, is expressed as a ratio, all independent 
variables (globalisation, education, business cycle, financial activity, government activity, 
shareholder orientation and trade union) are also expressed as ratios, except technological 
progress, which is expressed as a growth rate.  
We use the usual variable of growth in total factor productivity of the whole economy at 
2005 market prices as a proxy of technological progress, available on AMECO database (series 
number 8.2. – code ZVGDF). This variable is expressed as the difference between the growth 
rate of GDP and the growth rates of labour and capital weighted by their respective shares of 
total income. Total factor productivity summarises the use of inputs and their technological 
level. Globalisation is proxied by the level of an economy's openness: the sum of exports and 
imports divided by the gross domestic product at current market prices - variables collected 
from the Portuguese National Accounts (at current prices and in million of euros)3.  
The rate of upper-secondary schooling from PORDATA database is used to proxy 
education, and was the only education-related variable available for the entire period. This 
																																								 																				
2 Note that this measure of labour share includes both dependent and self-employed workers. We use the 
adjusted labour share to circumvent the bias related with the fact that the earnings of self-employed are 
treated as labour income in certain cases and as capital income in others (Dünhaupt 2013a).  
	
3 Even though this proxy of globalisation is only related with international trade, our assumption is that it 
is correlated with other dimensions of the phenomenon, notably foreign direct investment. 	
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variable is the ratio between the number of students enrolled in upper-secondary cycle with the 
usual age for that study cycle, and the total resident population for the same age group. 
The business cycle is described by the output gap obtained as the difference between 
actual and potential GDP at 2005 market prices (as a percentage of GDP), from AMECO (series 
number 6.5. – code AVGDGP). Output gap is computed using a production function approach 
(Denis et al., 2002).  
The proxy for financial activity is the gross value added of the financial sector 
(activities classified under category K according to the Eurostat NACE classification) divided 
by the gross value added of the economy (both at current prices and in million of euros), from 
PORDATA database and Eurostat respectively.   
Meanwhile, the level of government activity is measured by the total general 
government expenditure as a percentage of GDP at current market prices from AMECO. 
The proxy for firms’ shareholder orientation is the sum of interest and distributed 
income of enterprises (where dividends are included) paid by non-financial enterprises divided 
by the gross value added of these enterprises. These variables were obtained from the 
Portuguese National Accounts (at current prices and in million of euros), available at Instituto 
Nacional de Estatística. 
The importance of trade unions is described using the usual variable of trade union 
density from the Labour Force Statistics (OECD). This variable corresponds to the ratio of wage 
and salary earners that are trade union members, divided by the total number of wage and salary 
earners4. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix contain descriptive statistics of the data and the 
correlation matrix, respectively. 
 
4.2. METHODOLOGY 
As we will see in the next section, our set of variables includes those integrated of order 
zero and one. Consequently, we apply the methodology of Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) models proposed by Pesaran (1997) and further extended by Pesaran – Shin (1999) and 
Pesaran et al. (2001); this has the advantage of not requiring the same order of integration for all 
variables, as it can be applied with a mixture of variables integrated of order zero and one. An 
additional advantage of this technique is that it is more suitable for small samples.  
We proceed with five steps. First, we conduct unit root tests applying the augmented 
Dickey – Fuller (1979) (ADF) test and the Phillips – Perron (1998) (PP) test, in order to assess 
the order of integration of each variable and exclude the existence of variables integrated of 
order two as these cannot be included in an ARDL model.  
																																								 																				
4 Nevertheless, as emphasised by Bassanini – Duval (2006) and OECD (2006), this proxy tends to 
underestimate the bargaining power of workers, insofar as the number of trade union members is 
normally much lower than the workers covered by collective bargaining agreements.	
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The second step is to estimate the ARDL model; this explains the behaviour of the 
dependent variable by both its lagged values and by the contemporaneous and lagged values of 
the independent variables. An ARDL ( k21 q,...,q,q,p ) can be represented by (Pesaran – 
Pesaran 2009): 
 
(3) 
, where: 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
Note that ty  is the dependent variable, itx  is an independent variable, L is a lag 
operator such that 1tt yLy -= , and tw  is a 1s´  vector of deterministic variables, like the 
intercept term, seasonal dummies, time trends or exogenous variables with fixed lags. 
 The error correction model associated with the ARDL ( k
^
2
^
1
^^
q,...,q,q,p ) model can be 
obtained by writing the expression (3) in terms of the lagged values and first differences of 
ktt2t1t x,...,x,x,y  and tw , which could be represented as: 
 
(6) 
 
, where 
tEC  is the error correction term defined by: 
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conducting a traditional Wald test on )p,1(
^
f . Nonetheless, as stressed by Pesaran et al. 
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cointegration can be rejected if the calculated F-statistic is above the upper critical value; if it is 
below the lower critical value, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The result is inconclusive 
if the calculated F-statistic falls between the lower and upper critical values. 
Diagnostic tests will be applied in the fourth step to assess the adequacy of the model. 
We employ the autocorrelation LM test, the Ramsey RESET test, the normality test and the 
heteroscedasticity test. Moreover, we will perform the cumulative sum of recursive residuals 
(CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (CUSUMSQ) tests to assess 
the possible existence of structural breaks in the sample. 
Finally, long-term and short-term determinants of labour share and the robustness of 
results are analysed.  
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The empirical analysis starts with a study of unit roots. Plots of our nine variables 
(Figure A1 to Figure A9 in the Appendix) seem to indicate that while some of them are 
stationary in levels, others are non-stationary. Employing the ADF and PP tests (Table 1 and 
Table A3 in Appendix, respectively), we conclude that the variables labour share, technological 
progress, globalisation, business cycle and trade union are integrated of order zero. For the 
remaining four variables (education, financial activity, government activity and shareholder 
orientation), neither test can reject the null hypothesis of non-stationary at 5% significance 
level. We then performed the unit roots tests for the first differences of the latter four variables; 
and both tests reject the null hypothesis. These four variables are therefore integrated of order 
one. Hence, unit roots tests show that the variables are integrated of order zero or one, thus 
justifying the adoption of ARDL models. 
 
Table 1 – P-values of the ADF unit root test 
Variable 
Level First Difference 
Intercept Trend and Intercept None Intercept 
Trend and 
Intercept None 
LS 0.032* 0.147 0.049 0.001 0.836 0.000* 
TP 0.002 0.003* 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
GL 0.068 0.049* 0.935 0.000 0.013 0.000* 
ED 0.833 0.593* 0.861 0.151 0.385 0.070* 
BC 0.182 0.999 0.020* 0.002 0.004* 0.001 
FA 0.195* 0.408 0.641 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
GA 0.276* 0.988 0.600 0.000* 0.001 0.000 
SO 0.356* 0.884 0.738 0.005 0.000* 0.000 
TU 0.001 0.020* 0.066 0.294 0.089* 0.037 
Note: The lag lengths were selected automatically based on the AIC criteria and * indicates the 
exogenous variables included in the test according to the AIC criteria 
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As we have a set of eight independent variables for a relatively small sample, we start 
by estimating a model for labour share including only the four independent variables associated 
with financialisation (financial activity, government activity, shareholder orientation and trade 
unions), which we refer to as the short version of the model.  
We first determine the optimal lag length using information criteria and considering an 
unrestricted VAR. A number of lags between zero and three was considered because the 
unrestricted VAR does not satisfy the stability condition with a higher number of lags - at least 
one characteristic polynomial root is outside the unit circle (Lütkepohl 1991)5. Information 
criteria do not agree on the optimal lag; some indicate an optimal lag of two and others one 
(Table 2). We choose two lags as this is the choice of the majority of information criteria and 
taking into account that FPE (as well as AIC) is a better choice than the other criteria in the case 
of small sample sizes (sixty observations and below) - Liew (2004). Hence, we run an ARDL on 
Microfit software (5.0 version) considering two as the maximum order. Then, the software 
automatically defines the optimal number of lags (up to the defined limit of two) for each 
variable. 
 
Table 2 – Values of the information criteria by lag (short version) 
Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 n. a.  3.87e-16 -21.3 -21.1 -21.2 
1 248.2 1.35e-19 -29.3 -27.9 -28.9 
2 59.8* 4.22e-20* -30.6 -28.0* -29.7* 
3 27.7 5.04e-20 -30.7* -27.0 -29.6 
Note: * indicates the optimal lag order selected by the respective criteria 
 
We then apply the methodology developed by Pesaran et al. (2001), to assess whether 
there is a cointegration relationship between our five variables. No trend was considered 
because the labour share does not exhibit this characteristic. The computed F-statistic of 6.504 
is higher than the upper bound critical value at 1% (4.781)6, which means that the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected: there is evidence supporting the existence of a 
cointegration relationship between these variables.  
Next, we conduct four diagnostic tests to assess the adequacy of this model (Table 3). 
The model does not show evidence of autocorrelation (LM test) but, when using the Ramsey 
RESET test, we reject the null hypothesis of no misspecification, which suggests that the model 
may not be well specified in its functional form. This could be due to the omission of relevant 
variables (Studenmund 2005) as, here, we are estimating the labour share without the standards 
variables; these will be added later.  
																																								 																				
5 Results available upon request.  
	
6 Critical value bounds of the F-statistic were obtained in Pesaran – Pesaran (2009), considering intercept 
and no trend and for a number of variables equal to five. 	
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Residuals are normal and homoscedastic. Finally, plots of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
tests (Figure A10 and Figure A11 in the Appendix) show that the recursive residuals lie in 
between the straight lines at 5% significance levels, indicating that the coefficients are stable 
over the sample period and confirming the absence of structural breaks. In short, the estimated 
ARDL does not suffer from any serious econometric problem. 
 
Table 3 – Diagnostic tests for ARDL estimations (short version) 
Test Chi-square P-value F-statistic P-value 
Autocorrelation 0.288 0.592 0.202 0.657 
Ramsey’s RESET 15.045 0.000 19.271 0.000 
Normality  1.081 0.582 n. a.  n. a.  
Heteroscedasticity 0.197 0.657 186 0.669 
Note: We show two statistics for each test: the LM statistic (asymptotically distributed as a Chi-square) 
and the LM F or ‘modified LM’ statistic (F-statistic). 
 
Analysing the long-term equation, it can be concluded that only shareholder orientation 
and trade unions are statistically significant (Table 4). Nonetheless, financial activity and 
government activity, which are statistically insignificant, have the expected negative and 
positive signs, respectively. This seems to partially confirm the financialisation literature's claim 
that a rise in financial activity decreases the labour share and that a rise in government activity 
increases it. On the other hand, both coefficients of the statistically significant variables have the 
signs foreseen in the literature. Shareholder orientation exerts a negative influence on labour 
share; a 1 p.p. rise in financial payments of non-financial corporations lowers the labour share 
by around 0.258 p.p.. In turn, trade union density is a positive determinant of the labour share: a 
1 p.p. rise in this variable increases the labour income share by about 0.417 p. p. 
 
Table 4 – The long-term estimations of labour income share (short-version) 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error T-statistic 
FAt -1.110 1.000 -1.109 
GAt 0.470 0.284 1.652 
SOt -0.258* 0.138 -1.863 
TUt 0.339** 0.160 2.123 
β0 0.417** 0.168 2.482 
Note: ** indicates statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level 
 
In the short-term (Table 5), the coefficient of the error correction term is negative and it 
is significant at 1% significance level, confirming that the model is stable and converges to the 
long-term equilibrium. All variables are statistically significant in the short-term except for the 
lag of labour share and financial activity. Once again, financial activity has the expected 
negative sign, and government activity and trade unions continue to exert a positive influence 
on labour share. The only unexpected result is for the shareholder orientation variable, which 
has a positive influence on labour share in the short-term. This may be due to the fact that 
higher payout ratios can be the result of a better economic and financial situation of non-
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financial companies, which may in turn lead to an increase in wages in the short-term. In 
addition, it might also be explained by the fact that some companies attribute bonuses to 
workers based on their annual profits, and therefore high profits are associated with both high 
dividends and bonuses (included in wages).  
 
Table 5 – The short-term estimations of labour income share (short-version) 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error T-statistic 
∆LSt-1 0.173 0.130 1.328 
∆FAt -0.399 0.387 -1.032 
∆GAt 0.637*** 0.139 4.587 
∆SOt 0.125** 0.058 2.138 
∆TUt 0.122* 0.069 1.760 
ECt-1 -0.360*** 0.093 -3.863 
Note: ∆ is the operator of the first differences, *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** 
indicates statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level 
 
 Our next step is to re-estimate the labour share equation including not only the four 
variables related with the financialisation process, but also others linked to functional income 
distribution, namely technological progress, globalisation, education and business cycle. This 
should increase the consistency of our model by mitigating the problem of omitted variables. 
Although there is a risk that including irrelevant variables would decrease efficiency, it is a 
small one as care was taken to select variables related with the labour share. Finally, 
inconsistency is more problematic than inefficiency (Brooks 2009), hence the decision to 
include all eight independent variables. 
In this context, we start by assessing the lag length according to the different 
information criteria and considering an unrestricted VAR. Here, only lags between zero and two 
were considered because our sample size and the inclusion of eight independent variables does 
not allow the use of a higher number of lags. The criteria LR, FPE and AIC indicate two has the 
optimal lag, whereas SC and HQ indicate one lag. We choose two lags as a maximum order to 
run our ARDL as this is the conclusion drawn from the majority of the information criteria, 
including FPE and AIC that are the best choices for small samples.  
 There continues to be evidence of a cointegration relationship, insofar as the computed 
F-statistic of 4.892 remains higher than the critical value of the upper bound (3.989 at 1%)7.   
The diagnostic tests in Table 5 show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation, of normality or homoscedasticity; on the other hand, the plots of CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ continue to suggest that our coefficients are stable and confirm the absence of 
significant structural breaks8. The most important change in results is for the Ramsey RESET 
test as we can no longer reject the null hypothesis of no misspecification by the LM F statistic; 
																																								 																				
7 Critical value bounds of the F-statistic were obtained in Pesaran – Pesaran (2009), considering intercept 
and no trend and for a number of variables equal to nine. 
	
8 Results available upon request.	
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however, we continue to reject the null hypothesis by the LM statistic. Kiviet (1986) notes that 
in small samples the LM F is generally preferable to the LM version and so we can assume that 
this model is well specified in its functional form, suggesting as expected that the long version 
is more appropriate to describe the labour share.  
 
Table 6 – Diagnostic tests for ARDL estimations (long version) 
Test Chi-square P-value F-statistic P-value 
Autocorrelation 1.887 0.170 0.607 0.454 
Ramsey’s RESET 7.477 0.006 2.930 0.118 
Normality  1.566 0.457 n. a.  n. a.  
Heteroscedasticity 1.058 0.304 1.027 0.319 
 
In the long-term (Table 7), all variables are statistically significant except for 
technological progress, financial activity and shareholder orientation. The variable of 
shareholder orientation lost its statistical and economic significance but maintains the expected 
negative sign. Here, the statistical insignificance of the shareholder orientation could be 
explained by the fact that there has been no clear upward trend in financial payments by non-
financial firms in Portugal as demonstrated by Figure A8 in the Appendix. Moreover, Barradas 
(2015) shows that financial payments of Portuguese non-financial firms are below the European 
average. This is probably due to Portugal's “bank-based” financial system, which may mean 
non-financial firms feel less pressure to increase their payments to financial markets in the form 
of interest, dividends and stock buybacks. Banks tend to establish long-term relationships with 
clients and have a medium and long-term vision of clients’ businesses, which entails less 
pressure on firms to pay interest.  
On the other hand, all coefficients of the statistically significant variables have the 
expected signs. The business cycle has a positive influence on the labour share in the long-term 
according to the hypothesis of Estrada – Valdeolivas (2012).  
As expected, globalisation exerts a negative impact on the labour share, confirming the 
Hecksher-Ohlin model and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Education level is a positive 
determinant for the labour share. Government activity became statistically significant and with a 
positive sign, in line with the literature on financialisation. A 1 p.p. rise in total public 
expenditure increases the labour income share by around 0.598 p.p. Finally and as expected, 
trade union density remains statistically significant, and is a positive determinant of the labour 
share in the long-term: a 1 p.p. increase in trade unions raises the labour income share by about 
0.722 p.p. 
 
Table 7 – The long-term estimations of labour income share (long version) 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error T-statistic 
TPt 0.161 0.214 0.754 
GLt -0.304*** 0.047 -6.499 
EDt 0.224*** 0.032 6.948 
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BCt 0.665*** 0.133 4.997 
FAt 0.589 0.484 1.219 
GAt 0.598*** 0.191 3.128 
SOt -0.007 0.042 -0.174 
TUt 0.722*** 0.065 11.135 
β0 0.190** 0.083 2.284 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level and ** indicates statistical significance at 5% level 
 
 The error correction term continues to have a statistically significant negative 
coefficient (Table 8). As expected, globalisation still has a negative influence on the labour 
share in the short-term, while trade union density exerts a positive effect. Surprisingly, financial 
activity and shareholder orientation are positively related with the labour share in the short-term. 
In the case of the financial activity, this could be associated with the fact that the Portuguese 
financial sector traditionally has higher wages than other sectors. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of shareholder orientation has the same sign as in the short version of the model, and 
the same explanations for its impact are also applicable here. Government activity has a positive 
contemporaneous effect on labour share but it has a negative effect in the first lag. We therefore 
performed a Wald Test to determine whether the sum of the two effects is zero; we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis (Chi-square = 0.172, p-value = 0.678), and conclude that the net short-run 
effect of government activity in the labour share is null. The remaining variables (technological 
progress, education and business cycle) are not statistically significant. 
 
Table 8 – The short-term estimations of labour income share (long version) 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error T-statistic 
∆TPt 0.263 0.357 0.736 
∆GLt -0.347*** 0.091 -3.800 
∆GLt-1 -0.074 0.083 -0.889 
∆EDt 0.147 0.091 1.623 
∆BCt 0.378 0.443 0.852 
∆BCt-1 -0.277 0.179 -1.550 
∆FAt 1.908*** 0.606 3.150 
∆FAt-1 1.200 0.743 1.615 
∆GAt 0.651** 0.266 2.450 
∆GAt-1 -0.560* 0.284 -1.973 
∆SOt 0.173* 0.087 1.994 
∆SOt-1 0.137* 0.075 1.836 
∆TUt 0.546** 0.257 2.123 
ECt-1 -1.630*** 0.271 -6.007 
Note: ∆ is the operator of the first differences, *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** 
indicates statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 1% level 
 
It should also be noted that the results of the long version do not change greatly if we 
extend our measurement of the weight of financial activity to include both financial and real 
estate industries. 9 There is still a cointegration relationship between the variables and the model 
converges to the long-term equilibrium. The most important change is that technological 
progress is a statistically significant variable in the long-term and has the expected negative 
																																								 																				
9 This as well as the results of the sensitivity analyses below are available upon request. 
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sign. On the other hand, financial activity is statistically significant in the long-term but, in 
contradiction with the literature, has a positive sign.  
Similarly, the results are also quite similar if we choose the variable of net financial 
payments of non-financial enterprises (i.e. the difference between financial payments and 
financial receipts) instead of just financial payments. The existence of cointegration was 
confirmed and the model converges to the long-term. Once again, the most important change is 
that the technological progress variable is statistically significant in the long-term with the 
expected negative sign.  
Additionally and since the indebtedness of non-financial firms is a distinctive feature of 
the financialisation process in Portugal (Lagoa et al. 2014), we re-estimated the long version of 
the model replacing financial payments with a variable of non-financial firms' indebtedness10. 
Overall, the results do not change significantly. The variables are cointegrated and the variable 
of non-financial firms' indebtedness is positively related with the labour share in the long-term, 
suggesting that debt was used to improve the economic situation of firms in the long-term with 
a positive effect on wages.  
IMF's intervention in 1978-79 entailed a significant decline in the labour share (Figure 
A1). However, we obtain similar results (especially for the long-term equation) if we re-
estimate the long version of the model starting only in 1980. 
Finally, we re-estimated the long version of the model including a dummy variable for 
the years 2009 to 2012 and excluding the statistically insignificant variable of technological 
progress. These years correspond to a period of deep economic crisis in the Portuguese 
economy, visible in the negative output gap (Figure A5 in the Appendix). The first two years 
coincided with the Subprime crisis and the last two with the Portuguese sovereign debt crisis. 
Results are quite similar, except for the financial activity variable which becomes statistically 
significant with a positive coefficient both in the short- and long-term. The most important 
finding is that the dummy variable is statistically significant and with a negative coefficient; this 
proves that, during the crises, there were other factors not controlled in the model that 
contributed to a decline in the labour share. 
All the above analyses indicate that our results are robust to other specifications. In 
general, the robustness analysis seems to point to a negative effect of technological progress in 
the labour share in Portugal. In conclusion, we find evidence supporting the claim that 
financialisation influenced the labour share in Portugal, mainly due to the government activity 
and unionisation channels. Moreover, the traditional explanations of globalisation, technological 
progress, the level of education and business cycle also seem to be important determinants of 
the wage share.  
																																								 																				
10 This variable is the banking credit to non-financial firms over GDP from Bank of Portugal.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 The financialisation literature indicates three different ways in which the growth of 
finance contributed to the observed decline in labour share worldwide: the change in the 
sectorial composition of the economy, the emergence of the “shareholder value orientation” 
paradigm, and the weakening of trade union power.  
This paper makes an empirical analysis of the relationship between financialisation and 
functional income distribution in Portugal between 1978 and 2012. We estimated an equation 
for labour share using aggregate annual data and make use of both standard variables 
(technological progress, globalisation, education and business cycle) and four additional 
measures to reflect the different channels of financialisation (financial activity, government 
activity, shareholder orientation and trade union density).  
Since the variables are integrated of order zero and one, we use the ARDL bounds 
testing approach and determine the existence of cointegration between variables. The model 
distinguishes between long-term and short-term effects on the labour share. In the long-term, 
only the channels related with government activity and trade unions have a positive and 
statistically significance effect on the labour share. In the short-term, trade union density is 
positively related with the labour share, whereas financial activity and shareholder orientation 
have a positive influence on the labour share in contrast with what is foreseen in the literature.  
However, the labour share is also affected by the usual variables, particularly in the 
long-term, namely globalisation, education and business cycle. Output gap and education level 
have a positive effect, but the globalisation process exerts a negative influence. The sensitivity 
analysis shows also that technological progress has been capital augmenting in Portugal, thus 
having a negative influence on the wage share. 
Our findings demonstrate the indirect negative effects of financialisation on the labour 
share, but we are unable to find direct effects. Nevertheless, this shows that financialisation not 
only affects the functional income distribution of economies like the USA and the UK, but also 
of a much smaller, less developed, less financialised and more peripheral economy like 
Portugal.   
This is an important lesson for policy makers, particularly in more peripheral European 
countries, including those of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It adds to the existing evidence 
that financialisation occurs in non-core countries (notably in Latin America and in CEE; Becker 
et al. 2010) and that it is an important determinant of the downward trend in labour share 
observed in most countries (Stockhammer, 2009 and 2012; Kristal, 2010; Peralta – Escalonilla, 
2011; Dünhaupt, 2011; Estrada – Valdeolivas, 2012; and Lin – Tomaskovic-Devey,2013). Our 
paper highlights the fact that financialisation impacts functional income distribution especially 
through the indirect channels of government expenditure and trade union activity. The CEE 
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countries are particularly vulnerable in these two indicators as they already have lower levels of 
public spending and trade union density than Europe's core countries (EU15). Therefore, the 
impact of future increases in financialisation on the labour income share should be a relevant 
concern, despite the low level of financial payments by non-financial corporations in CEE 
countries (Barradas, 2015).  
Stockhammer (2009), Dünhaupt (2013b) and the International Labour Organisation 
(2011) warn that policy measures are required to stabilise the labour share and they provide a set 
of suggestions for that purpose. According to our results, in order to contain the fall in the 
labour share, policy makers should control the downsizing of government activity, foster higher 
levels of education in the workforce (see also IMF, 2007), and avoid a decline in the bargaining 
power of trade unions. Efforts should also be made to improve trade specialisation in order to 
better position the economy in the globalised market. 
The negative impact of the public sector cuts on the labour share need to be mitigated. 
Firstly, areas in which public provision is beneficial or the advantages of private provision are 
questionable should be kept within the public sphere, despite the pressure to broaden the 
influence of private interests. When assessing the advantages of reducing public intervention in 
the economy, it is important to take into account the social dimension as well as the economic 
and financial dimensions. Regulations must prevent firms, notably privatised ones, from 
exploiting market power to make profits above the fair level. 
It is relevant to reassess the advantages of the deregulation of labour markets, notably 
the reduction in unemployment benefits, employment protection, and minimum wage. When it 
is necessary to foster employment, deregulation should be used with care to avoid a further 
decline in wages and in trade union influence. In the context of the flexicurity principles 
advocated by the EC (2007: Chapter 5) to address technological progress and globalisation, 
active labour market policies are necessary to offset the reduction in employment protection.  
Continuous and effective social dialogue between firms’ management and trade unions 
must be fostered so that they can work together to resolve problems and address challenges. In 
addition, if trade union representatives were given a seat on corporation boards, as in some key 
German firms, it would avoid a detrimental focus on shareholder value (Stockhammer, 2009). 
In the context of social dialogue, trade unions and employers must strive to bring real wages 
increase in line with labour productivity growth.  
Since financialisation weakens the power of trade unions and leads to cuts in the public 
sector, some additional measures could be taken to reduce the shareholder value orientation of 
corporations. Monetary incentives for managers need to be linked to medium/long-term profits, 
and there should be fiscal incentives for productive investment and disincentives for financial 
investments by non-financial corporations; moreover, excessive dividend pay-out ratios and 
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stock buyback should be taxed at a higher rate. In general terms, the stronger regulation of 
financial institutions can have a positive effect on the wage share.  
Finally, the labour intensive sectors that are more exposed to international competition 
based on low costs, should receive government support to upgrade their competitive position by 
creating more value added per unit through differentiation or niche strategies.  
Despite possible data difficulties, it would be interesting in future research to analyse 
the effect of financialisation on labour share using firm-level or industry-level data, in order to 
assess whether the effects depend on the industry or firm size, as in Lin – Tomaskovic-Devey 
(2013) and Alvarez (2015).  
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8. APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 – The descriptive statistics of the data 
 LS TP GL ED BC FA GA SO TU 
Observations 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Mean 0.598 0.012 0.638 0.424 -0.001 0.063 0.410 0.245 0.312 
Median 0.587 0.009 0.644 0.515 -0.002 0.062 0.416 0.231 0.255 
Maximum 0.746 0.057 0.780 0.725 0.050 0.078 0.515 0.465 0.608 
Minimum 0.542 -0.017 0.433 0.089 -0,050 0.049 0.308 0.154 0.194 
Standard Deviation 0.004 0.019 0.068 0.220 0.027 0.007 0.052 0.081 0.130 
Skewness 1.750 0.576 -0.437 -0.273 -0.029 0.388 -0.117 1.187 1.034 
Kurtosis 5.693 2.511 4.140 1.460 2.463 2.627 2.369 3.839 2.649 
 
 
Table A2 – The correlation matrix between variables 
 LS TP GL ED BC FA GA SO TU 
LS 1         
TP 0.18 1        
GL -0.74*** -0.33* 1       
ED -0.44*** -0.47*** 0.60*** 1      
BC -0.15 0.05 0.10 0.17 1     
FA -0.39** -0.10 0.54*** 0.13 0.07 1    
GA -0.51*** -0.48*** 0.60*** 0.91*** 0.03 0.33* 1   
SO 0.23 -0.19 -0.04 -0.51*** -0.50*** 0.21 -0.33** 1  
TU 0.69*** 0.42** -0.67*** -0.92*** -0.33* -0.32* -0.89*** 0.53*** 1 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates statistical significance at 5% level and 
* indicates statistical significance at 10% level 
 
 
Table A3 – P-values of the PP unit root test 
Variable 
Level First Difference 
Intercept Trend and Intercept None Intercept 
Trend and 
Intercept None 
LS 0.001* 0.027 0.049 0.001 0.004 0.000* 
TP 0.002 0.004* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
GL 0.069 0.051* 0.969 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
ED 0.826* 0.814 0.989 0.000* 0.002 0.000 
BC 0.169 0.604 0.020* 0.003 0.014 0.000* 
FA 0.185* 0.354 0.681 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
GA 0.588 0.990* 0.666 0.074 0.144 0.006* 
SO 0.352* 0.595 0.558 0.008 0.037 0.000* 
TU 0.001* 0.940 0.000 0.002 0.000* 0.004 
Note: * indicates the exogenous variables included in the test according to the AIC criteria 
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Figure A1 – Labour income share (% of gross domestic product) 
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Figure A2 – Technological progress (annual growth rate) 
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Figure A3 – Globalisation (% of gross domestic product) 
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Figure A4 – Education of the labour force (%) 
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Figure A5 – Business cycle (%) 
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Figure A6 – Financial activity (% of gross value added of total economy) 
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Figure A7 – Government activity (% of gross domestic product) 
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Figure A8 – Shareholder orientation (% of gross value added of non-financial firms) 
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Figure A9 –Trade union density (%) 
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
TU
 
29 
	
Figure A10 – The plot of cumulative sum of recursive residuals 
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Figure A11 – The plot of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals 
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Figure 1 – The effects of financialisation on inequality of functional income distribution (decrease in 
labour income share) 
 
 
 
 
 
Inequality of income distribution 
Change in sectorial composition Increasing importance of finance Downsizing of government activity 
  
“Shareholder value orientation” Rise in top management salaries Rise in the profit claims of rentiers 
  
Weakening of trade unions 
“Shareholder value orientation” 
Increasing importance of finance 
Downsizing activity of public sector 
Deregulation of labour markets 
Liberalisation and globalisation 
Source: Authors’ representation based on Hein (2012), Hein and Detzer (2014), Michell (2014), Hein and 
Dodig (2015), among others 
	
Table 1 – P-values of the ADF unit root test 
Variable 
Level First Difference 
Intercept Trend and Intercept None Intercept 
Trend and 
Intercept None 
LS 0.032* 0.147 0.049 0.001 0.836 0.000* 
TP 0.002 0.003* 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
GL 0.068 0.049* 0.935 0.000 0.013 0.000* 
ED 0.833 0.593* 0.861 0.151 0.385 0.070* 
BC 0.182 0.999 0.020* 0.002 0.004* 0.001 
FA 0.195* 0.408 0.641 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
GA 0.276* 0.988 0.600 0.000* 0.001 0.000 
SO 0.356* 0.884 0.738 0.005 0.000* 0.000 
TU 0.001 0.020* 0.066 0.294 0.089* 0.037 
Note: The lag lengths were selected automatically based on the AIC criteria and * indicates the 
exogenous variables included in the test according to the AIC criteria 
	
Table 2 – Values of the information criteria by lag (short version) 
Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 n. a.  3.87e-16 -21.3 -21.1 -21.2 
1 248.2 1.35e-19 -29.3 -27.9 -28.9 
2 59.8* 4.22e-20* -30.6 -28.0* -29.7* 
3 27.7 5.04e-20 -30.7* -27.0 -29.6 
Note: * indicates the optimal lag order selected by the respective criteria 
	
Table 3 – Diagnostic tests for ARDL estimations (short version) 
Test Chi-square P-value F-statistic P-value 
Autocorrelation 0.288 0.592 0.202 0.657 
Ramsey’s RESET 15.045 0.000 19.271 0.000 
Normality  1.081 0.582 n. a.  n. a.  
Heteroscedasticity 0.197 0.657 186 0.669 
Note: We show two statistics for each test: the LM statistic (asymptotically distributed as a Chi-square) 
and the LM F or ‘modified LM’ statistic (F-statistic). 
	
Table 4 – The long-term estimations of labour income share (short-version) 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error T-statistic 
FAt -1.110 1.000 -1.109 
GAt 0.470 0.284 1.652 
SOt -0.258* 0.138 -1.863 
TUt 0.339** 0.160 2.123 
β0 0.417** 0.168 2.482 
Note: ** indicates statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level 
	
Table 5 – The short-term estimations of labour income share (short-version) 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error T-statistic 
∆LSt-1 0.173 0.130 1.328 
∆FAt -0.399 0.387 -1.032 
∆GAt 0.637*** 0.139 4.587 
∆SOt 0.125** 0.058 2.138 
∆TUt 0.122* 0.069 1.760 
ECt-1 -0.360*** 0.093 -3.863 
Note: ∆ is the operator of the first differences, *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** 
indicates statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 10% level 
	
Table 6 – Diagnostic tests for ARDL estimations (long version) 
Test Chi-square P-value F-statistic P-value 
Autocorrelation 1.887 0.170 0.607 0.454 
Ramsey’s RESET 7.477 0.006 2.930 0.118 
Normality  1.566 0.457 n. a.  n. a.  
Heteroscedasticity 1.058 0.304 1.027 0.319 
	
Table 7 – The long-term estimations of labour income share (long version) 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error T-statistic 
TPt 0.161 0.214 0.754 
GLt -0.304*** 0.047 -6.499 
EDt 0.224*** 0.032 6.948 
BCt 0.665*** 0.133 4.997 
FAt 0.589 0.484 1.219 
GAt 0.598*** 0.191 3.128 
SOt -0.007 0.042 -0.174 
TUt 0.722*** 0.065 11.135 
β0 0.190** 0.083 2.284 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level and ** indicates statistical significance at 5% level 
	
Table 8 – The short-term estimations of labour income share (long version) 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error T-statistic 
∆TPt 0.263 0.357 0.736 
∆GLt -0.347*** 0.091 -3.800 
∆GLt-1 -0.074 0.083 -0.889 
∆EDt 0.147 0.091 1.623 
∆BCt 0.378 0.443 0.852 
∆BCt-1 -0.277 0.179 -1.550 
∆FAt 1.908*** 0.606 3.150 
∆FAt-1 1.200 0.743 1.615 
∆GAt 0.651** 0.266 2.450 
∆GAt-1 -0.560* 0.284 -1.973 
∆SOt 0.173* 0.087 1.994 
∆SOt-1 0.137* 0.075 1.836 
∆TUt 0.546** 0.257 2.123 
ECt-1 -1.630*** 0.271 -6.007 
Note: ∆ is the operator of the first differences, *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** 
indicates statistical significance at 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at 1% level 
	
Table A1 – The descriptive statistics of the data 
 LS TP GL ED BC FA GA SO TU 
Observations 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Mean 0.598 0.012 0.638 0.424 -0.001 0.063 0.410 0.245 0.312 
Median 0.587 0.009 0.644 0.515 -0.002 0.062 0.416 0.231 0.255 
Maximum 0.746 0.057 0.780 0.725 0.050 0.078 0.515 0.465 0.608 
Minimum 0.542 -0.017 0.433 0.089 -0,050 0.049 0.308 0.154 0.194 
Standard Deviation 0.004 0.019 0.068 0.220 0.027 0.007 0.052 0.081 0.130 
Skewness 1.750 0.576 -0.437 -0.273 -0.029 0.388 -0.117 1.187 1.034 
Kurtosis 5.693 2.511 4.140 1.460 2.463 2.627 2.369 3.839 2.649 
Table A2 – The correlation matrix between variables 
 LS TP GL ED BC FA GA SO TU 
LS 1         
TP 0.18 1        
GL -0.74*** -0.33* 1       
ED -0.44*** -0.47*** 0.60*** 1      
BC -0.15 0.05 0.10 0.17 1     
FA -0.39** -0.10 0.54*** 0.13 0.07 1    
GA -0.51*** -0.48*** 0.60*** 0.91*** 0.03 0.33* 1   
SO 0.23 -0.19 -0.04 -0.51*** -0.50*** 0.21 -0.33** 1  
TU 0.69*** 0.42** -0.67*** -0.92*** -0.33* -0.32* -0.89*** 0.53*** 1 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates statistical significance at 5% level and 
* indicates statistical significance at 10% level 
	
Table A3 – P-values of the PP unit root test 
Variable 
Level First Difference 
Intercept Trend and Intercept None Intercept 
Trend and 
Intercept None 
LS 0.001* 0.027 0.049 0.001 0.004 0.000* 
TP 0.002 0.004* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
GL 0.069 0.051* 0.969 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
ED 0.826* 0.814 0.989 0.000* 0.002 0.000 
BC 0.169 0.604 0.020* 0.003 0.014 0.000* 
FA 0.185* 0.354 0.681 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
GA 0.588 0.990* 0.666 0.074 0.144 0.006* 
SO 0.352* 0.595 0.558 0.008 0.037 0.000* 
TU 0.001* 0.940 0.000 0.002 0.000* 0.004 
Note: * indicates the exogenous variables included in the test according to the AIC criteria 
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Figure A4 – Education of the labour force (%) 
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Figure A5 – Business cycle (%) 
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Figure A6 – Financial activity (% of gross value added of total economy) 
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Figure A7 – Government activity (% of gross domestic product) 
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Figure A8 – Shareholder orientation (% of gross value added of non-financial firms) 
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Figure A9 –Trade union density (%) 
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Figure A10 – The plot of cumulative sum of recursive residuals 
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                        Note: The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
 
Figure A11 – The plot of cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals 
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Note: The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level 
 
 
